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message as well as their mutual interaction. We nest our findings in the standard version 
of the investment game. Our data provide evidence that while both stand-alone 
mechanisms enhance trust, and a gift performs significantly worse than a message. 
Moreover, when a gift is combined with sending a message, it can be counterproductive.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Trust and trustworthiness are vital components of social and economic exchange 
and without their presence many welfare-increasing interactions would not take place.1
Whether the gift or the message is more effective in promoting trust and 
enhancing the efficiency of the relationship is an empirical question. Our experimental 
design includes treatments that allow us to observe the performance of each mechanism 
in isolation and as well as examine their interaction. An important feature of the design is 
 
Given that societies benefit from maintaining stable levels of trust and trustworthiness, it 
is important to ask: What types of mechanisms are best suited for achieving this goal? 
The motivation for our study draws on findings from the negotiation literature. In 
particular, before an agreement is made, parties negotiate the terms and often make 
concessions to win trust of the other party (e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1991). In our 
understanding, this suggests that it is important to combine words with actions that have 
monetary consequences.  
In the presented experiment, we study two stylized mechanisms for promoting 
trust. One is a costly gift from the trustee to the trustor prior to playing the investment 
game that makes the trustor at least as well off as if no transaction ever took place. While 
certain aspects of gift giving have previously been explored in the context of dictator and 
gift-exchange games (see Camerer, 2003 and Cooper and Kagel, 2009 for excellent 
surveys), the novelty of our approach is that here gift preceeds the actual transaction and 
acts as a catalyst. The other mechanism is a written message, which involves no explicit 
monetary costs.  
The choice of these two mechanisms is motivated not only by the fact that one 
often complements the other in real world applications (e.g., in striking a deal, a 
handshake often comes along with a bottle of wine), but also because neither of these 
mechanisms relies on any enforcement or intervention from an external party, such as 
courts or escrow. The nature of the moral hazard problem in the ensuing investment game 
is the same whether the trustee sends a gift or writes a message to the trustor. Therefore, 
the two mechanisms are directly comparable.  
                                                 
1 See Arrow (1974), Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et al. (1997) 
and Zak and Knack (2001) on the documented importance of trust. 
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that in our Interaction treatment the agent has the complete freedom to use either 
mechanism alone or both together. Therefore, the choices made by subjects reveal what 
they believe is the optimal usage of monetary and nonmonetary mechanisms in fostering 
trust. 
In addition to observing choices, we also ask our subjects to interpret the reasons 
for using each mechanism. This allows us to gain better understanding of how the 
subjects’ choices are connected to their perceptions of their counterpart’s intentions. To 
the best of our knowledge, our data set is the first to allow the analysis of the 
interpretations of gifts and messages, which contributes to a growing literature on the 
content of communication.  
Recent theoretical and experimental literature has produced some relevant 
insights into various other mechanisms that have been shown to influence the decisions 
of trustors and trustees.2
                                                 
2 For example, Berg et al. (1995), Bolton et al. (2004), Ellingson and Johanesson (2004), Engle-Warnick 
and Slonim (2004), Andreoni (2005), Andreoni and Samuelson (2006), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), 
Huck et al. (2006), Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007), Bracht and Feltovich (2009), Charness et al. 
(2008), Servátka et al. (2008), Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009), Ben-Ner et al. (2009), Deck et al. (2011) 
and many others. 
 
 Satisfaction guaranteed and escrow accounts -- two examples of 
costly mechanisms fostering relationships -- were experimentally studied by Andreoni 
(2005) and Bracht and Feltovich (2008), respectively. In their designs, giving the trustor 
an option to annul the transaction or forfeit the amount that the trustee deposited in the 
escrow account can provide sufficient incentives for the trustee to act upon the terms of 
deal. In practice, both of the mechanisms hinge on external enforceability, and thus it is 
not obvious whether they increase the intrinsic propensity to trust (i.e., whether the 
trustors would act in the same manner if the annulment of the transaction or forfeiting the 
escrow account were up to the trustee’s discretion) or only replace trust with incentives 
relying on the rationality of trustees that make the trustors behave in the same way as if 
they were trusting. However, satisfaction guaranteed, escrow accounts and other 
enforceable trust-enhancing mechanisms are not always available to the transacting 
parties. Therefore, it is important to understand the effect of widely available mechanisms 
that do not rely on enforceability. 
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While both strands of the literature on costly and costless mechanisms find that 
the levels of trust and trustworthiness can be enhanced, they do not allow for a direct 
comparison of their relative importance. This is due to different experimental settings 
across the studies, and more specifically and importantly, because of the aforementioned 
enforceability differences. In what follows, we present an experiment specially designed 
to address these two issues. 
 
2. The Experiment 
Our experiment consists of a 2x2 design (presented in Table 1) with treatment 
variables being the ability to unilaterally communicate and to give a $10 gift by the 
trustee. In all four treatments, subjects play the standard version of Berg et al. (1995) two 
stage investment game: There are two players, A and B, both endowed with $10. In stage 
one, player A decides how much of his initial endowment to send to his counterpart, i.e., 
he chooses a whole dollar amount {0,1,...,10}S∈ . The remaining portion of the 
endowment is his to keep. The amount sent is tripled by the experimenter. In stage two, 
player B decides how much of the tripled amount, {0,...,3 }R S∈ , to return to player A.  
The amount kept by player B is added to his own endowment (if any).    
 
Table 1: Experimental Design 
 No Gift Gift 
No Message Baseline Gift 
Message Message Interaction 
 
The treatments vary in the pre-game stage: Baseline does not have a pre-game 
stage; in Message, player B can send a hand-written free form message to player A; in 
Gift, player B has an option to transfer his whole $10 endowment to player A or keep it 
for himself (irrespective of player Bs decision, player A is still constrained to send a 
maximum of $10 in stage one of the game); and finally, in Interaction, we study the 
interplay of the two variables by allowing player B to send a message and/or to transfer 
his endowment to player A. 
Our objective is to compare the two mechanisms for inducing trust (gift giving 
and message) in terms of their impact on the overall efficiency as determined by the 
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transfer of player A. Ex ante, it is not clear which of these mechanisms is more effective. 
It is important to note that both a gift and a cheap talk message can be interpreted in the 
same way in our design. That is, both can be viewed by player A as a strong signal that 
player B is trustworthy, or as a strategic move of player B to induce a higher amount sent 
and a preparation for defection.  
From the perspective of making meaningful comparisons of the two mechanisms, 
it is crucial that they are similar in structure. While allowing also for an intermediate 
amount of a gift would produce richer data that could possibly reveal further insights into 
the effects of gift giving on trust, we decided to implement a simpler setting to avoid the 
problem of having to find a “matching level of communication” in the other treatment. In 
the current design, both mechanisms produce binary outcomes (gift or no gift and 
message or no message) that reduce the complexity and simplify the interpretation of 
subjects’ choices. 
At the same time, the message is left free-form because it was our objective to 
compare mechanisms at their best performance. From the perspective of the recipient, the 
best gift in the Gift treatment is obvious, but this is quite unclear in the Message 
treatment. However, as opposed to a gift, a message is costless (when one abstracts from 
cognitive and writing costs of constructing the message) and therefore the sender always 
has the incentive to select the most persuasive one.3
Following our discussion in the introduction section, we have no theoretical 
reasons to favor gift giving over message or vice-versa. A message may represent a 
promise,
  
4 but it is still a cheap talk. A gift, on the other hand, is a costly signal (along the 
lines of the idiom ‘put your money where your mouth is’), which might be a reason in 
itself for thinking that it will perform better than a stand-alone message. Then again, it 
has been documented that money can sometimes crowd out intrinsic motivation (Ostrom, 
2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy, 2004; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b).5
                                                 
3 An alternative design would be to use prefabricated messages, but Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) show 
that such approach greatly reduces the power of communication. 
4 A promise as presented by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).  
5 A nice exposition of possible detrimental effects of explicit monetary incentives can also be found in Fehr 
and Falk (2002). 
 It is, 
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therefore, plausible that giving a gift could have a negative effect on trust and perform 
worse than sending a message.6
 Both Gift and Message are intended to induce a higher amount sent by player A.  
We expect that giving subjects the option to use both mechanisms will do at least as well 
as when they are limited to using just one of them. Our intuition is based on the fact that 
the subjects can now take advantage of both worlds. That is, give a gift to establish 
reputation (Servátka, 2009 and 2010) and/or trustworthiness via foregoing earnings as 
well as insuring that player A can be no worse off from investment than he was at the 
beginning of the game, and send a message to establish psychological enforcements (e.g., 
reciprocity, guilt, conformism) and counteract/address the potential negative aspects of 
gift giving that may lead to the crowding out of intrinsic trust. Lastly, if one of these 
mechanisms clearly dominates the other, then subjects can simply choose to use that 
mechanism and abstain from the other. 
  
3. Procedures 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, 
New Zealand. A total of 270 subjects participated in the study. Most of the students had 
previously participated in economics experiments, and some (but not a majority) had 
experience with investment-game-like-scenarios. Each subject only participated in a 
single session of the study. On average, a session lasted 50 minutes including the initial 
instruction period and payment of subjects. Subjects earned on average 17.21 NZD.7
Each session included a minimum of 12 subjects who were randomly matched 
into pairs. The assignment of pairs was done according to the following process. The 
classroom was segmented in half such that all subjects of a given type would be located 
in the same half of the room. The desks for each type were arranged in two rows facing 
the wall, and thus neither type would be able to see the other when making decisions. The 
  All 
sessions were hand run in a classroom. 
                                                 
6 The behavior of both players can be seen as ‘proxies’ for trusting and trustworthy behavior (Charness et 
al. 2008). There are other possible motivations why players would send and return positive amounts, such 
as other-regarding preferences (Cox, 2004) or preferences for increasing social welfare (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002). One could, of course, also ask the follow up question: How does a message and a gift affect 
other-regarding preferences? In this paper we are primarily concerned with the size of the transfer and 
efficiency and leave this other exploration for future research. 
7 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was 10.25 NZD per hour.  
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subjects were free to choose any seat upon entering the classroom. After the subjects 
signed experiment consent forms, the experimenters publicly flipped a coin to determine 
which side of the room was to be which type. The allocation of a player A and player B 
to a particular pair was done by experimenters randomly pairing one subject from each 
side of the room together. 
The instructions were projected on the screen and read aloud.8 The investment 
game and general procedures were explained first. Only then did the experimenters 
announced that: “Before you play the described game, player B will have an opportunity 
to write a message / send their endowment / write a message and/or send their 
endowment to their counterpart player A” and projected as well as read aloud the 
instructions for the pre-game stage.9
                                                 
8 The subject instructions are provided in Appendix A. 
9 Obviously, there was no pre-game stage in Baseline. 
 At the end of the instruction period, the 
experimenters privately answered subjects’ questions (if any). 
In the pre-game stage, player Bs were given the opportunity to write a message / 
transfer their endowment / write a message and/or transfer their endowment to their 
counterpart player A on the provided pre-game decision form. In Gift and Interaction 
treatments the experimenters then filled in the blank in the following sentence on player 
As’ decision form:  
 
Player B has transferred $____ to you before the start of the game.  This 
amount is yours to keep and will be added to your earnings. 
 
Player As were then asked to answer a question why they believed that player B 
transferred or did not transfer their $10 endowment to them in the pre-game. It was 
emphasized that this information would remain private.  
In Message and Interaction treatments the experimenters passed the same pre-
game decision sheet with (or without) a message to player As from their counterpart 
player B. Player As were asked to answer a question why they believed that player B sent 
or did not send a message to them in the pre-game and what did the message (a lack of 
message) mean to them. Again, it was emphasized that this information would remain 
private. 
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At the beginning of the experiment both players were endowed with $10.10
                                                 
10 If Player B decided to transfer his endowment in the pre-game stage in Gift and Interaction treatments, he 
would start the investment game with $0, while his counterpart player A with $20. For a further discussion, 
see the results section or Servátka et al. (2010). 
 In 
stage one of the investment game, irrespectively of the treatment, player As had to decide 
how much of their $10 endowment they wanted to keep for themselves and how much to 
transfer to their anonymous player B counterpart. This was done by writing down a non-
negative integer from 0 to 10 on their decision sheet. As a check for understanding, the 
player As also had to answer how much money they kept for themselves. Once everyone 
made their decisions, all the decision sheets were collected. The experimenters completed 
the following statement on player Bs’ decision sheets in order to indicate to player B the 
amount sent to them from their counterpart player A and the tripled amount for which 
they needed to make their allocation decision:  
 
Player A has transferred $______ to you in Stage 1.   
The experimenter has tripled this amount, and you have received $_______ 
 
After all decision sheets were returned, player Bs decided how much of the tripled 
amount to transfer back to their counterpart player A and how much of it to keep for 
themselves. Once again as a check for understanding, player Bs had to write down both 
the amount returned and kept for themselves. 
Upon the completion of stage two, one of the experimenters collected all decision 
sheets while the second experimenter transferred the decision information of player Bs to 
their player A counterparts' decision sheet. The first experimenter then returned the 
decision sheets to all participants to reveal their overall earnings. Lastly, subjects 
completed a short questionnaire. Upon completion, subjects were privately paid their 
earnings for the session. 
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4. Results 
The purpose of our experiment is to study the effectiveness of gifts and messages 
in promoting trust and enhancing the efficiency of relationships. While the efficiency in 
all treatments solely depends on the amount sent by player As, the potential differences in 
subjects’ behavior could be due to different usage of the two mechanisms (i.e., the 
proportion of player Bs who choose to give a gift and/or send a message in the pre-game 
stage) and the consecutive reaction by player As to receiving a gift and/or a message.  
Note also that in order to shed some light on the issue of whether one of the 
mechanisms dominates the other in terms of inducing a higher amount sent by player As, 
we compare the usage and effects of each of them in isolation (Message and Gift) relative 
to the case when both mechanisms are available at the same time (Interaction).  
We therefore present a comparison of subjects’ behavior according to the 
following four criteria: (i) usage of available mechanisms; (ii) amount sent by player As 
conditional on employing available mechanism(s); (iii) overall efficiency at the treatment 
level; and (iv) amount and proportions returned by player Bs.  
 
Result 1 (Usage of available mechanisms): A stand-alone message was used 
more frequently than a stand-alone gift. In Interaction, a message was used more often 
than a gift and the usage of either mechanism remained similar to that in isolation. 
 
Support for Result 1: The summary statistics of subjects’ behavior across all four 
treatments is presented in Table 2. As can be seen from the table, both mechanisms were 
used frequently: In Message 35 out of 36 (97.2%) subjects chose to send a message11
In Interaction, 30 out of 32 (93.8%) player Bs sent a message while 19 out of 32 
(59.4%) gave a gift.
; in 
Gift 26 out of 34 (76.5%) subjects chose to give a gift. According to the 2-sided Fisher’s 
exact test, this difference is statistically significant (p = .012).  
12
                                                 
11 The paired player A of the only person who did not send a message sent 0 in stage one. 
12 In one of the two cases when player B did not sent a message, the paired player A sent 0 and in the other 
he sent 6 while player B responded with returning 8. 
 This difference is also statistically significant (p = .002), which is 
perhaps not surprising because of the obvious difference in monetary costs. Interestingly 
enough, all 19 player Bs who gave a gift in Interaction also wrote a message to player A, 
10 
suggesting that the message is at least as important as a monetary transfer. Finally, there 
is no difference between the usage of either mechanism in Interaction or in isolation (p = 
.598 and .118 for messages and gifts, respectively). □ 
  
Table 2: Summary Statistics – Amount Sent by Player As and Returned by Player Bs 
 Baseline 
(n=33) 
Message 
(n=36) 
Gift 
(n=34) 
Interaction 
(n=32) 
 
Sent Returned Sent Returned Sent Returned Sent Returned 
Average 5.55 [4.07] 
4.87 
(29.3%) 
[6.35] 
8.92 
[2.67] 
12.75 
(47.7%) 
[7.95] 
6.47 
[4.17] 
3.38 
(17.4%) 
[5.08] 
7.88 
[3.97] 
7.81 
(33%) 
[6.49] 
Median 5 2 10 15 9.5 0 10 10 
Avg if Gift Given - - 
7.31 
[3.82] 
{26} 
3.58 
(16.3%) 
[4.50] 
8.95 
[3.15] 
{19} 
8.42* 
(31.4%) 
[4.73] 
Avg if No Gift - - 
3.75 
[4.33] 
{8} 
2.75 
(24.4%) 
[7.00] 
6 
[4.61] 
{13} 
7.50 
(41.7%) 
[8.70] 
Avg if Message 
Sent  - 
9.17 
[2.22] 
{35} 
13.11 
(47.7%) 
[7.76] 
- 
8.20 
[3.80] 
{30} 
 
8.06** 
(32.8%) 
[6.43] 
 
Avg if No Message - 
0.00 
[0] 
{1} 
- - 
3.00 
[4.24] 
{2} 
4.00 
(44.4%) 
[5.66] 
Standard deviations in brackets. Number of subjects in subsamples in braces. Amount returned as a 
percentage of the triple amount sent in parentheses. 
*All (19/19) player Bs also sent a message  
**19/30 player Bs also gave a gift. 
 
 
Result 2 (Amount sent): Conditional on employing the available mechanism(s), 
a message induces higher amount sent by player As than a gift. Both mechanisms, 
whether employed individually or together, increase the amount sent comparing to 
Baseline. Finally, the combination of a message and a gift in Interaction outperforms a 
stand-alone gift and does not do better than a stand-alone message in the respective 
treatments.13
                                                 
13 Unless otherwise noted, giving a gift and sending a message refers to Gift and Message treatments, 
respectively. 
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Support for Result 2: In order to test whether a gift or a message influences the 
subjects’ behavior to a greater degree, we compare the amount sent by player As in 
Message and Gift treatments conditional on employing the available mechanism (see the 
bottom four rows in Table 2). While both mechanisms increase the average and the 
median amount sent by player As relative to Baseline, the conservative robust rank-order 
test presented in the right hand side panel of Table 3 detects that the difference is strongly 
statistically significant if a message was sent (p = .000), but only marginally if a gift was 
given (p = .083). A less conservative nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test detects the 
latter difference at a higher significance level (p = .044). Finally, the amount sent in 
Message following a message was statistically significantly higher than the amount sent 
in Gift treatment following a gift (p = .047).  
 While making the two treatments comparable in terms of incentives resulting 
from the use of Message and Gift, our design creates non-negligible differences in terms 
of potential income effects if player B decides to give a gift, but does not distinguish 
whether the larger amount sent by player A in comparison to Baseline was due to player 
A currently having $20 rather than $10 or whether it was the received gift that was 
responsible for the observed increase. In a follow-up note to the current paper (Servátka 
et al., 2010), we address this issue directly and find that the “gift effect” causes the 
increase in amount sent while the larger endowment had no significant effect on player 
A’s decision.  
Lastly, we test whether a combination of sending a gift and a message in 
Interaction enhances the amount sent by player A in comparison to a stand-alone gift or a 
stand-alone message in the respective treatments.  According to the robust rank-order test 
reported in Table 4, the amount sent in Gift after a gift was given is lower than the 
amount sent in Interaction (p = .064) when both mechanisms were employed 
simultaneously. The same test does not detect statistically significant difference between 
Message and Interaction (p = .891) conditional on mechanisms being used, but it is worth 
noticing that the average amount sent is higher in the treatment where only sending a 
message is available, suggesting that the usage (not necessarily the availability) of giving 
a gift might undermine the incentives generated by the message. □  
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Table 3: Robust Rank-Order Test Results for Amount Sent by Player As 
  All data   Conditional on the Mechanism Used 
Efficiency 
ordering: Message  Interaction  Gift  Message  Interaction  Gift 
Baseline a -3.56    -2.34   -0.93   -3.86   -3.22   -1.39 
  (.000)   (.009)   (.175)   (.000)   (.001)   (.083) 
                        
Gift -2.47   -1.50   -   -1.99   -1.85   - 
  (.014)   (.135)   -   (.047)   (.064)   - 
                        
Message -   -   -   -   -0.14   - 
  -   -   -   -   (.891)   - 
                        
Interaction -0.66   -   -   -   -   - 
  (.511)   -   -   -   -   - 
a All tests comparing the Baseline data to other treatments are 1-sided. 
p-values in parentheses  
 
 
Result 3 (Efficiency): The treatment with the highest efficiency (as measured by 
actual realized payoffs for each pair of players over the maximum possible payoffs) was 
Message (89.2%), followed by Interaction (78.8%), and Gift (64.7%). The lowest level of 
efficiency was observed in Baseline (55.5%). 
 
Support for Result 3: The efficiency levels in each treatment depend on the 
amount sent by player As (see the first two rows of Table 2) as a reaction to the 
mechanism used (or whether no mechanism was used) by player Bs in the pre-game. The 
robust rank-order tests presented in Table 3 reveal that the amount sent by player As in 
Message and Interaction are higher than in Baseline (p = .000 and .009, respectively). 
The same test does not detect a significant difference between the amount sent in Gift 
treatment and Baseline (p = .175). Therefore, the mere availability of the message 
mechanism itself as well as message and gift together (in Interaction) significantly 
increased efficiency comparing to Baseline while the availability of gift increased 
efficiency only insignificantly. □ 
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Result 4 (Amount and proportions returned): Player Bs who sent a stand-alone 
message returned a higher proportion of the tripled amount comparing to Baseline, while 
player Bs who gave a stand-alone gift returned a lower proportion. In Interaction, those 
player Bs who employed both mechanisms simultaneously returned more compared to 
Baseline, but this was still less than player Bs who sent a message in Message.  
 
Support for Result 4: Table 2 presents a summary of player Bs’ behavior across 
the four treatments in terms of the absolute amount as well as the proportion of the tripled 
amount returned. However, because of different strategy spaces available to individual 
player Bs this only draws a partial picture on their behavior. To get a better understanding 
of player Bs’ behavior conditional on the use of mechanism, we exclude subjects whose 
only choice was to return zero in order to partly correct for correlation of choices caused 
by the experimental design and compare the distributions and the medians of amount 
returned by player Bs using Epps-Singleton and robust rank-order test (respective upper 
and lower line within each category in Table 4). Our data indicate that when the available 
mechanism(s) is (are) employed, i.e., gift is given in Gift, message sent in Message, and 
both message and gift provided in Interaction, the amount returned in Message 
(proportion returned = 47.7%) is higher than in Gift (16.3%) and Interaction (31.4%) as 
well as in Baseline (29.3%). In all three cases the distributions are different at the 1% 
level, i.e., p = .000.  
It is possible that player Bs who gave a gift returned a lower proportion than in 
Baseline as they might have felt that they were entitled to the money they were sent by 
player A and were reluctant to return relatively large amount back because they had to 
pay to influence the outcome (see Gächter and Riedl, 2005 for a study on entitlement 
effects). A similar entitlement arises in experiments with real effort where subjects give 
less to their partners when they have to exert effort to earn their endowment (e.g., 
Rutström and Williams, 2000; Cherry et al., 2002) or the role that gives them some sort 
of advantage in the game (e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Hoffman et al., 1994).14
The tests in Table 4 also reveal that if a gift was given in Gift, then the amount 
returned was lower than if a message and gift were used simultaneously in Interaction (p 
 
                                                 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this explanation. 
14 
= .001), altogether suggesting that sending a message increases trustworthiness but giving 
a gift undermines it. □ 
 
Table 4: Epps-Singleton and Robust Rank-Order Tests of Player Bs’ Returns 
Treatment Message Message Sent Gift 
Gift  
Given Interaction 
Interaction 
(Message 
Only) 
Interaction 
(Gift and 
Message) 
Baseline 29.15 (.000) -3.36 (.001) 
29.14 (.000) 
-3.36 (.000) 
7.60 (.107) 
1.20 (.229) 
11.70 (.020) 
0.98 (.330) 
24.32 (.000) 
-2.10 (.036) 
19.79 (.001) 
-0.74 (.460) 
45.78 (.000) 
-2.23 (.026) 
Message - - 62.55 (.000) 5.41 (.000) - 
41.42 (.000) 
2.60 (.009) - - 
Message 
Sent - - - 
85.71 (.000) 
5.78 (.000) - 
24.74 (.000) 
0.69 (.493) 
73.33 (.000) 
3.04 (.002) 
Gift - - - - 19.93 (.001) -3.4 (.001) - - 
Gift Given - - - - - 8.79 (.067) -1.34 (.180) 
16.99 (.002) 
-3.47 (.001) 
Tests exclude observations where player A sent 0 to player B. 
Epps-Singleton test presented above robust rank-order test within each category. 
p-values in parentheses.  
 
 
5. Interpretation Analysis of Gifts and Messages 
To gain a deeper insight into the inner workings of gifts and messages, we have 
asked their recipients (player As) for their interpretations of why the message or the gift 
was sent to them.15
                                                 
15 The main reason for including questions regarding player As’ interpretation of messages and beliefs was 
to increase our understanding of the two mechanisms. Additionally, the answers enabled us to verify that 
the subjects had a good understanding of the game. We decided to include non-salient questions after every 
decision in all treatments for consistency reasons and also not to highlight in the eyes of the subjects which 
of the decisions were crucial for our study as increased cognitive attention might cause the subjects to 
behave differently. Obviously, by including the non-salient questions on subjects’ decision forms, our 
procedures differ from the standard way the investment game is run. We have, therefore, checked our data 
against data in Cox (2004) for any effects of including these questions and have found no significant 
differences in subjects’ behavior in the respective baseline treatments. 
 These interpretations serve as foundations for the decisions of player 
As. There are two advantages of asking this question: (i) we obtain cleaner data about 
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decision-relevant content of messages than if we just coded the content of messages; and 
(ii) we obtain data on interpretations of gifts that we would not be able to get otherwise. 
This allows for a comparison of gifts and messages in terms of the intentions they signal 
to the recipient. 
Following the standard in the communication literature (e.g., Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009; 
Ben-Ner et al., 2009), we have coded the interpretations of messages and gifts into 
several categories. Because a gift is qualitatively different in its nature than a message, 
we have selectively and subjectively chosen the most relevant categories for each of 
them. Two undergraduate students have independently coded all the statements into the 
provided categories, assigning a value of 1 if the category reflected the content of the 
message and 0 otherwise. The two students read subjects’ instructions to the game, but 
were not told the specifics about our research question. We took a conservative approach 
and considered a statement as belonging to a category only when both of our coders have 
agreed.16
First, we analyze the contents of stand-alone messages and stand-alone gifts by 
looking at the Message and Gift treatments separately. Then, we look at the impact that 
messages combined with gifts had on the amount sent. This is done by comparing Gift 
and Interaction treatments.
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The interpretations of messages have been coded into the following categories: 
proposal of Equal Split, proposal of Equal Payoffs, Promise, Trust appeal, Pleasantries 
(e.g. thank you, smiley face), and statement implying both being Better Off. All the 
remaining interpretations were categorized as Other. Table 5 reports for each category 
the frequencies of interpretations along with average amount sent. The first two rows 
summarize the full data. Notice that a problem with this categorization might be that if 
 
 
5.1. Interpretations of Messages 
                                                 
16 The coder instructions are provided in Appendix B. 
17 A similar comparison could be done between Message and Interaction treatment. In the Interaction 
treatment, the gift and an accompanying message complement one another. It would make little sense to 
ask for the interpretation of each of them separately. With gifts as the main object of our interest, we have 
chosen to ask about the interpretation related to gifts. Thus we can directly compare the Gift and Interaction 
treatments in terms of content.    
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some interpretations of messages carry rich contents and hence fall into more than one 
category, our data would become non-independent. This could confound our analysis. To 
avoid this problem, in the bottom two rows we report data for only “clean” interpretations 
that fall in just a single content category, e.g., a message was interpreted as just a promise 
and nothing else. We limit our statistical testing to clean data with at least four 
observations per category. 
 
Table 5: Interpretations of Messages (Message Treatment) 
 Equal 
Split 
Equal 
Payoffs Promise Trust Pleasantries 
Better 
Off Other 
All Message 
Interpretations 
       
Frequency 5.56%    {2} 
5.56%    
{2} 
13.89%  
{5} 
2.78%   
{1} 
5.56%     
{2} 
38.89%    
{14} 
41.67%    
{15} 
Average Amount 
Sent   
10 
[0]   
9.64 
[1.34] 
7.73 
[3.67] 
Clean Message 
Interpretations 
       
Frequency 
  
11.11%  
{4}   
30.56% 
{11} 
41.67%    
{15} 
Average Amount 
Sent 
  
10       
[0]   
10       
[0] 
7.73 
[3.67] 
Number of interpretations coded into a given category in braces. Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
The results clearly show that player As primarily interpreted the messages as 
either carrying a promise to return higher amount or implying that sending more to player 
B would ultimately make both players better off. From the bottom two rows of Table 5 it 
becomes apparent that both of these interpretations induced a full amount sent on the part 
of player As. The difference between Better Off and Other is significant at 10% level 
according to a robust rank-order test (one sided p = .058).18
                                                 
18 Albeit all player As who interpreted a message as promise sent the maximum amount, this category 
contains only four observations and thus the statistical test would not have enough significant power. 
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5.2. Interpretations of Gifts 
The interpretations of gifts have been coded into the following categories: 
Minimizing Risk, indicating Good Will, inducing Guilt, implying Reciprocity, and 
implying both players being Better Off. The category Other contains all remaining 
observations – in this case, both when a gift was sent but was not interpreted according to 
any of our categories or when a gift was not sent. 
 
Table 6: Interpretations of Gifts (Gift and Interaction Treatments) 
 Min. 
Risk 
Good 
Will Guilt Reciprocity 
Better 
Off Explanation Other 
All Gift 
Interpretations 
       
Frequency 0% {0} 
17.65%   
{6} 
0% 
{0} 
50.0%   
{17} 
8.82%    
{3}  
38.24%    
{13} 
Average Amount 
Sent  
7.5 
[4.18]  
8.64  
[2.78] 
2.67 
[2.52]  
3.85 
[4.1] 
Clean Gift 
Interpretations        
Frequency  5.88% {2}  
35.29%  
{12} 
5.88% 
{2}  
38.24%    
{13} 
Average Amount 
Sent    
9.75  
[0.62]   
3.85 
[4.1] 
All Interaction 
Interpretations        
Frequency 0% {0} 
0% 
{0} 
0% 
{0} 
18.75%  
{6} 
25.0% 
{8} 
43.75%  
{14} 
28.13% 
{9} 
Average Amount 
Sent    
8.33  
[4.08] 
10 
[0] 
8.57  
[3.63] 
5.78 
[4.63] 
Clean Interaction 
Interpretations        
Frequency    12.5% {4} 
15.63% 
{5} 
28.13% 
{9} 
28.13% 
{9} 
Average Amount 
Sent    
7.5 
[5] 
10 
[0] 
7.78  
[4.41] 
5.78 
[4.63] 
Number of interpretations coded into a given category in braces. Standard deviations in brackets. 
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Looking at the clean data one can quickly spot that most gifts were interpreted as 
an attempt to establish a reciprocal relationship between the players. The difference in the 
amount sent between Reciprocity and Other is substantial and significant at 1% level with 
p = .000.19
The bottom line is that a message has the power to alter the interpretation of the 
gift itself and it appears to be a delicate issue as to how to best use and explain a gift so 
that it is most effective in inducing trust. A robust finding in our data seems to be that a 
key to building a trusting relationship is in conveying the idea that both players are 
entering a mutually beneficial transaction that will result in both of them being better off. 
Incidentally, our data also highlight a difference between the degrees of trust following a 
gift that is (with the help of a message) interpreted as mutually beneficial (category Better 
Off) and a message that comes without a gift (in the same Interaction treatment). The 
 
A different story emerges when gifts are accompanied by a message. A message 
seems to switch the interpretation of the gift from a reciprocal relationship to both players 
benefiting. The impact of this is efficiency enhancing as player As who interpret the 
message along these lines send their whole endowment without an exception. On the 
other hand, those who maintain the reciprocity interpretation do not send as much as they 
did in Gift treatment. 
The combination of a gift and a message in Interaction treatment allows for the 
most complete analysis. We define an additional category Explanation that indicates 
whether the message attempted to explain why the gift was sent or not sent. As can be 
seen from Table 6, the explanation itself enhances the amount sent relative to Other, but 
the difference is not significant. However, an interesting subsample is one in which the 
gift was sent and the accompanying message contained an explanation. About 42% of 
gifts carried a message with an explanation. For this subsample, the increase in amount 
sent becomes more pronounced as its mean jumps to 8.75 (standard deviation 3.54). The 
Explanation raises the amount sent above the Other category at 10% level (p = .083).  
                                                 
19 One may have a concern that Other is not quite the appropriate benchmark for comparison as it pools 
observations when gift was given, but was not interpreted according to any of our categories and 
observations when gift was not given. We find no difference between amounts sent by player As in these 
two subgroups (the former has five data-points with mean 4 and standard deviation 4.18, the latter has eight 
data-points with mean 3.75 and standard deviation 4.33). Therefore, we feel comfortable pooling all these 
into the single category Other.    
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mean in the former is 10 (see Table 6) and the mean in the latter is 6.91 (standard 
deviation 4.59). Although the difference is not significant, the overall lesson learned may 
be the following: in real life where gifts and messages are all available tools at our 
disposal, the best way to generate trust (according to our results) is to use a gift and tailor 
a message to highlight its welfare enhancing purpose. 
 
6. Discussion 
 This paper reports an experiment that studies relative performance and mutual 
interaction of two mechanisms that are qualitatively different, but comparable. Our data 
provide evidence that both Gift and Message mechanisms significantly enhance amount 
sent in comparison to the standard investment game. However, we find that gift giving 
performs significantly worse than free form written messages. Furthermore, our results 
point to the fact that gift giving can even be counterproductive when combined with the 
ability to send a message. It still remains an open question, however, whether giving a 
gift is a negative signal towards its recipient, e.g., that the recipient is not a trusting 
person, or a negative signal about the giver, i.e., that the giver cannot be trusted. 
Our results imply that the gift undermines the trust generated by the message. 
This corroborates the findings of Gneezy (2004) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 
2000b) who have observed qualitatively similar behavior in different contexts. Thus, our 
paper could be viewed as the next step in establishing generality of these conclusions. 
 Our results are also in line with Brandts and Cooper (2007) who observe that 
communication enhances coordination better than financial incentives. The presented 
experiment also complements earlier work by Andreoni (2005) who finds that offering a 
satisfaction guarantee always increases trustworthiness of player Bs, even when honoring 
it is fully voluntary, but only elicits the trust of player As when it is legally enforced. On 
the other hand, our findings seem to be at odds with Bracht and Feltovich (2008) who 
find that a chosen high escrow amount leads to more efficient outcomes. However, it is 
important to notice that there is no direct comparison to our study because escrow 
effectively eliminates the need for trust, which does not happen in our setting with Gift. 
Furthermore, we have implemented only one level of a gift, and hence it is plausible that 
a larger gift (if available) would increase trust significantly. 
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In order to better understand the two studied mechanisms, we have complemented 
the data analysis with a novel way of studying communication. Rather than classifying 
the messages according to researchers’ subjective (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; 
Schotter and Sopher, 2007; Kimbrough et al., 2007) or third party salient (e.g., Houser 
and Xiao, 2011) or non-salient (e.g., Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010) opinions and then 
linking these interpretations to subjects’ decisions, we asked the decision-makers to 
interpret the messages themselves. Such approach eliminates the possibility of classifying 
messages differently than the decision-maker and thus has a potential of producing more 
accurate estimates of behavior while being more efficient in terms of time and research 
expenditures. We have also shown that in our setting employing this method did not alter 
subjects’ behavior.  
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Appendix A: Subject Instructions 
 
[These are the general instructions presented at the beginning of every session.] 
 
You are a Player ____         ID#:____ 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
This is an experiment studying decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which 
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is therefore very important that you 
read these instructions with care. 
 
No Talking Allowed 
It is prohibited to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Should you have 
any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
 
Anonymity  
Each person will be randomly matched with another person in the experiment.  No one will learn the 
identity of the person she/he is matched with.  You will be matched with the same person for the 
entire experiment.   
 
Types 
Each two person group will consist of two types of participants (Player A and Player B) that are 
assigned randomly.  Your assigned type will be listed at the top of each task instruction sheet. 
 
The Game 
You are randomly paired with another individual. One member of your pair will be a player A 
and the other one will be player B. Find your type in the upper right corner of this sheet. You will 
never be able to find out the identity of the player you are paired with. 
 
Each player’s final dollar payout will be determined according to the process below.  The game is 
divided into stages in which players take turns making decisions.  Both player A and player B 
begin the game with $10.  We will refer to this initial $10 as each player’s endowment.  
 
Stage 1: 
At the beginning to stage 1, player A has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or none of 
his/her $10 endowment to player B. The amount that is not transferred is player As to keep.  The 
amount that player A transfers triples when it reaches player B. For example, if A transfers $10 to 
B, B receives $30. If A transfers $5 to B, B receives $15. If A transfers $0 to B, B receives $0. 
 
Stage 2: 
Player B then has the opportunity to transfer all, any portion, or none of the tripled amount that 
was transferred to him/her from player A. The amount that is not transferred is player Bs to keep, 
and the amount transferred is added to player A’s final dollar payout.  
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[These are the Gift instructions for the pre-game stage specific to player B.  That is, only player 
Bs received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed on the overhead 
for all to see and read aloud by the experimenter.] 
 
You are a Player B        ID#:____ 
Pre-Game Instructions 
 
Player A is endowed with $10.    Player B is endowed with $10. 
 
The Game to be played NEXT
 Player A must decide how much, if any, of his/her $10 endowment he/she wants to transfer to 
player B.    
: 
 Each dollar that is not transferred is player As to keep. 
 Each dollar that is transferred to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. 
 Player B must then decide how much, if any, of this tripled amount they want to transfer back 
to player A and the remaining portion is theirs to keep. 
Before we play this game, Player B has the opportunity to transfer his/her $10 endowment 
to player A and the opportunity to write a message to Player A.    
 
If player B transfers the $10, then it is added to player A’s earnings. 
If player B does not transfer the $10, then it is added to player B’s earnings. 
 
Note: If the $10 endowment is transferred by player B,  
 it DOES NOT
 the $10 transferred 
 increase the amount that player A has available to transfer in Stage 1. 
IS NOT
 Player A is guaranteed to be at least as well off as the initial starting position ($10 
endowment) regardless of both players’ transfer decisions during the game. 
 tripled. 
 
Why did you transfer or not transfer your $10 endowment to player A? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
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[These are the Interaction treatment instructions for the pre-game stage specific to player B. That 
is, only player Bs received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed 
on the overhead for all to see and read aloud by the experimenter. After the decisions were made 
by player B, the exact sheet was given to the counterpart player A to reveal the decision and 
message (if any).] 
 
 
You are a Player B        ID#:____ 
 
 
Pre-Game Decision Sheet 
 
You have the opportunity to write a message to player A.  If you choose to write anything to 
your counterpart, please write the message on the space below: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
 
Please complete the statement below by circling one of the amount: 
I have decided to transfer the following to player A: 
 
 
$0     or     $10 
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[These are the Stage 1 instructions (decision sheets) specific to player A.  That is, only player As 
received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed on the overhead for 
all to see and read aloud by the experimenter.  Player Bs never saw the actual decision sheet of 
their counterpart.  The information/decisions were transferred to Player B’s decision sheets by the 
experimenter.  Therefore, all handwriting was the same and no additional messages/information 
could be transferred.] 
 
You are a Player A        ID#:____ 
 
The Game: Stage 1 Decision Sheet 
 
 
Player B has transferred $____ to you before the start of the game.   
This amount is yours to keep and will be added to your earnings. 
 
Why do you believe Player B transferred or did not transfer their $10 endowment to you in 
the pre-game? 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
The Game decision: 
You must decide how much, if any, of your $10 endowment you want to transfer to player B.    
 
Each dollar that is not transferred is yours to keep. 
 
Each dollar that is transferred to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. 
 
Please complete the statements below.  Your decisions must be non-negative integers, e.g. 0, 
1, 2,…, 10. 
 
 
I have decided to transfer $______ to player B. 
 
 
Therefore, I have decided to keep $______ for myself.
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[These are the Stage 1 instructions (decision sheets) specific to player B.  That is, only player Bs 
received these particular instructions (decision sheets), but a copy was placed on the overhead for 
all to see and read aloud by the experimenter.  Player As never saw the actual decision sheet of 
their counterpart.  The information/decisions were transferred to Player A’s decision sheets by the 
experimenter.  Therefore, all handwriting was the same and no additional messages/information 
could be transferred.] 
 
 
You are a Player B         ID#:____ 
 
The Game: Stage 2 Decision Sheet 
 
 
Player A has transferred $______ to you in Stage 1.   
The experimenter has tripled this amount, and you have received $_______. 
 
Why do you believe Player A transferred $____ to you in stage 1? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
 
You must decide how much, if any, of the $______ you want to transfer to player A. 
 
Each dollar that is not transferred is yours to keep. 
Each dollar that is transferred is added to player A’s earnings. 
 
Please complete the statements below.  Your decisions must be non-negative integers. 
 
 
 
I have decided to transfer $______ to player A. 
 
 
Therefore, I have decided to keep $_______ for myself.  
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Appendix B: Coder Instructions 
 
Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game. 
 
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment. 
 
Coding Rules: 
 
(1) The unit of observation is a single message. 
 
(2) If a message is deemed to contain the relevant category of content, enter “1” for the category 
in the relevant row, otherwise enter “0”. 
 
(3) Each unit can be coded under as many or few categories as you deem appropriate. Enter the 
additional codes in rows at the bottom. 
 
(4) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which 
statements should fall into which categories. 
 
(5) Your job is to capture what had been said rather than why it was said or what effect it had. 
Think of yourself as a “coding machine.” 
 
Please track the time you spend on coding the messages and training. You will be paid $18 for 
each hour working on this project. Thank you. 
 
